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FAA REGULATORY POWER - NOISE RESTRICTIONS -
The FAA has broad discretion in granting noise regula-
tion exemptions to noncompliant carriers, but the FAA
must apply consistent criteria in granting or denying ex-
emptions, and provide a reasoned explanation for any
failure to adhere to its own precedents. Airmark Corp. v.
Federal Aviation Administration, 758 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
Airmark Corporation is a charter airline which operates
one B-707-100 series airplane configured with thirty-four
seats.' It is the only known company to offer public
figures an unmarked airplane for anonymous transporta-
tion at the client's demand.2 Its clients include multina-
tional corporate executives, high ranking foreign officials,
and entertainment groups.3 In 1983, Airmark began its
operations with a used B-707 airplane purchased from in-
tervenor Flying Tiger Line, Inc.4 In August, 1984, it re-
ceived FAA authority to use the airplane, and between
August and December 1984 made over sixty takeoffs and
landings at United States airports. 5 Responding to con-
gressionally mandated noise requirements,6 Airmark, in
1984, contracted with Aviation Technical Support of
Waco, Texas, (ATS) for a Noise Reduction Nacelle (hush
kit) to quiet its B-707 engines. 7 The mandate, FAA regu-
lation 14 C.F.R. section 91.303, required all four-engine
aircraft to comply with lower noise level standards by Jan-
, Brief for Petitioner Airmark Corp. at 5, Airmark Corp. V. FAA, 758 F.2d 685
(D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner].
2 See id. According to Airmark, no other airline offers an executive configuration
B-707 available for public charter. Id.
3Id.
4 Id. at 9.
5 Id. at 5.
6 See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
7 Petitioner, supra note 1, at 6.
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uary 1, 1985.8
In anticipation of the oncoming compliance date, sev-
eral new entrepreneurial firms began developing hush kits
for four-engine airplanes, but could not deliver them by
the deadline date.' Unable to acquire a hush kit before the
January 1, 1985 deadline,' 0 Airmark, on April 12, 1984,
applied for an exemption from section 91.303, and for a
general rulemaking to reevaluate the deadline and re-
quirements of the noise compliance rule. " While the FAA
did not act on Airmark's petition for a rulemaking,' 2 the
FAA denied Airmark's request for an exemption.' 3
Airmark petitioned for reconsideration of the exemption
and supplemented its petition with a copy of its hush kit
contract.' 4 On December 18, 1984, thirteen days before
the deadline, the FAA Administrator denied Airmark's pe-
tition for reconsideration.' 5
8 14 C.F.R. § 91.303 (1986) Final compliance: Subsonic airplanes.
Except as provided in § 91.306 (replacement airplanes) and
§ 91.307 (two engine aircraft), on and afterJanuary 1, 1985, no per-
son may operate to or from an airport in the United States any sub-
sonic airplane covered by this subpart, unless that airplane has been
shown to comply with Stage 2 or Stage 3 noise levels under Part 36
of this chapter.
Id.
, Petitioner, supra note 1, at 21. The efforts of NASA and the Boeing Aircraft
Company, on which the FAA based its 1976 rulemaking and its December 18,
1984 order, never resulted in a commercially available hush kit. No FAA certifi-
cate to permit aircraft operations with such hush kits (called a Supplemental Type
Certificate or STC) has ever been issued.
As of January, 1985, only Comtran hoped to receive a STC for its B-707-300
series hush kit. Aviation Technical Support projected a March, 1985 STC and the
various DC-8 hush kit manufacturers projected STC's in various months of 1985.
For the B-707-100, Aviation Technical Support projects a May, 1985, certification.
In the summmer of 1984, Airmark entered into and funded a contract with Avi-
ation Technical Support for a May 1985 delivery position. Airmark advised the
FAA of its contract, with documentation at the end of August, 1984. Id
10 Petitioner, supra note 1, at 6.
11 Brief for Respondent, Federal Aviation Administration at 7, Airmark Corp. v.
FAA, 758 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985). [hereinafter cited as Respondent].
12 Id. at note 5. A general rulemaking applies to many carriers as does the noise
abatement rule. Id. Since the FAA did not act on Airmark's petition for a
rulemaking, the issue could not be reviewed. See Airmark, 758 F.2d at 690 n.13.
13 Respondent, supra note 11, at 7.
14 Petitioner, supra note 1, at 4.
I, d. at 3.
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On December 21, 1984, Airmark petitioned the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to review the FAA's denial
of its exemption request and to grant an emergency stay
of enforcement of section 91.303 pending final resolu-
tion.1 6 Three days before the January 1, 1985 deadline,
the FAA sua sponte granted Airmark a restrictive partial ex-
emption.' 7 Airmark renewed its request for interlocutory
relief by challenging the restrictions on the exemption.',
Although Airmark did not file a new petition to review the
partial exemption, the court granted Airmark a stay from
section 91.303 until after oral argument.1 9
The court th~n consolidated for argument three cases
in which carriers challenged FAA denials or partial denials
of exemptions from section 91.303 as arbitrary and capri-
cious. 20 Additionally, several interveners challenged the
FAA's authority to grant partial or full exemptions to any
carrier. 2 1 Held: the denial of exemptions and grant of a
partial exemption vacated. The FAA has broad discretion
in granting noise regulation exemptions to noncompliant
carriers, but the FAA must apply consistent criteria in
granting or denying exemptions, and provide a reasoned
explanation for any failure to adhere to its own prece-
16 Id. Airmark sought judicial review pursuant to Federal Aviation Act § 1006,
49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1982):
(a) Orders subject to review; petition for review.
Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board or Secretary
of Transportation under this chapter, except any order in respect of
any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the President as
provided in Section 1461 of this Appendix, shall be subject to review
by the courts of appeals of the United States or the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upon petition, filed
within sixty days after the entry of such order, by any person disclos-
ing a substantial interest in such order. After the expiration of said
sixty days a petition may be filed only by leave of court upon a show-
ing of reasonable grounds for failure to file the petition theretofore.
Id.
,7 Airmark, 758 F.2d at 689.
18 Id. Airmark claims the restrictions on the partial exemptions has the practical
effect of a denial. Id.
19 Petitioner, supra note 1, at 3.
2o Airmark, 758 F.2d at 687.
21 Id.
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dents. Airmark Corp. v. Federal Aviation Administration, 758
F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Law
1. Congressional and Administrative Response to Jet Noise
In the 1960's, despite substantial airline investment in
noise abatement research and fleet updating,22 jet noise
remained a problem. In 1968, Congress responded to the
noise problem by adding section 611 to the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958,3 which authorized the FAA to prescribe
noise control and abatement standards.24 At the same
time, in section 611 (b) (4)25 Congress directed the FAA to
22 See R. RAMSEY, LEGAL CONTROL OF AVIATION NOISE (1969). Following World
War II several groups such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), the Federal Aviation Agency, the Bureau of Standards of the United
States, as well as airframe manufacturers, carriers, and others, conducted exten-
sive research on aircraft noise reduction. Id. at 29-44. The first commercial jet
flights by United States carriers began in October, 1958. Thereafter in 1959, the
aviation industry formed the National Noise Abatement Council (NANAC), a non-
profit organization, to combat aircraft noise pollution. Id. at 37. The NANAC
membership included all areas of aviation, particularly pilots, engineers, and en-
gine manufacturers. Id.
Early on, carriers exhibited concern for jet noise by delaying the adoption ofjet
engines for two years because of excessive volume. Id. at 39. By 1962, the carri-
ers had spent over $50 million on research and development for in-flight sound
suppressors, and actually installed suppressors in 325 jet aircraft at a cost of
$60,000 per engine, at a total cost of over $73 million. Id. By 1965, the industry's
noise reduction investment reached $150 million for suppressors alone. Id. at 40.
Introduction of the fan-jet engine significantly reduced noise pollution from jet
operations. Id. Consequently, all United States airlines with aircraft on order de-
manded the new fan-jet engine instead of the older, noisier turbo-jet engine. Id.
One airline actually replaced its entire fleet with the quieter engine at a cost of $1
million per aircraft. Id. Furthermore, airlines at Kennedy International Airport
paid more than $11 million for runway extensions to abate noise pollution. Id. at
41.
2- Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(d)(4) (1982).
24 Id. In prescribing and amending standards and regulations under this sec-
tion, the FAA shall:
"consider whether any proposed standard or regulation is economi-
cally reasonable, technologically practicable, and appropriate for the
particular type of aircraft, aircraft engine, appliance, or certificate to
which it will apply."
25 Id.
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ensure that regulations were "economically reasonable,
technologically practicable and appropriate for the partic-
ular type of aircraft.... 26
In 1969, pursuant to section 611(b)(4), 27 the FAA is-
sued aircraft noise standards in part 36 of the Federal Avi-
ation Regulations(FARs).2 s These regulations set noise
restrictions for aircraft then under design29 and estab-
lished a uniform system of measuring aircraft noise.3 °
However, the regulations did not affect aircraft already
certified by 1969.3' Four years later, in 1973, the FAA
amended part 36 to require that all newly built aircraft,
even those of older design, meet the part 36 standards.3
As aircraft design and noise suppression technology de-
veloped, the FAA again amended part 36 to require that
airplanes manufactured after 1975 meet stricter noise
standards.
Part 36 is divided into three noise stage categories.3 4
Stage one consists ofjet aircraft, such as B-707s and DC-
8s, designed prior to 1969, the effective date of the origi-
nal noise control standards, and manufactured before
1973, when the stricter standards went into effect.3 5 Stage
two consists of aircraft built between 1973 and 1975, or
designed and built between 1969 and 1973.36 Stage two
airplanes meet the original noise ceilings set by the FAA
in 1969.7 Stage three consists of aircraft built after 1975,
and they must meet the strictest noise standards set by the
26 Id.
27 See Airmark, 758 F.2d at 687. The FAA promulgated a series of regulations
addressing noise control for future aircraft design. Id.
28 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1986).
29 Id.
30 Id. See infra note 39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the uniform
system of measuring aircraft noise.
31 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1986).
22 38 Fed. Reg. 29,569 (1973).
32 42 Fed. Reg. 12,360 (1977).
- See Airmark, 758 F.2d at 687 n.3. See infra note 39 for a discussion of the noise
categories.
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FAA.38 Stage three aircraft are the quietest.3 9
In 1976, the FAA issued part 91 of the FARs4 ° giving
the stage two or stage three standards retroactive effect to
stage one aircraft.41 Because part 91 only applied to do-
mestic airlines, aircraft used on international routes re-
mained unaffected.4 2  Consequently, noncompliant
domestic carriers with stage one aircraft had three op-
tions: (1) buy new compliant aircraft; (2) reengine
noncompliant aircraft; (3) purchase hush kits if they be-
came available before January 1, 1985. 43
The first option, buying new compliant aircraft, re-
quired a huge capital expenditure.4 4 However, these new
aircraft are more fuel efficient as well as quieter.45 Some
38 Id.
39 Id. In developing progressively tighter aircraft noise standards, the various
categories of standards became known by the shorthand terms the FAA uses to-
day. Stage one aircraft are those which were type certificated before 1969, manu-
factured before January 1, 1974, and not subject to any noise requirements at the
time of certification. These include the B-707s involved in the present case, many
of which were produced during the late 1950s and 1960s. Stage two aircraft are
those certificated after 1969 or built after December 31, 1974, which must con-
form to the first mandatory noise standards issued by the FAA. In this category
are B-747s, DC-9s, DC-10s, B-727s, and B-737s. Stage three aircraft are those for
which applications for type certificates were made after November 5, 1975, which
meet the lowest noise levels. The B-757s and B-767s are typical of this group. Id.
See also Brief for Federal Respondents at 5-6, Tradewinds Airway, Ltd. v. DOT and
FAA, 758 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
The reduction in noise generated by aircraft through this process has been sub-
stantial. The four-engine stage one aircraft such as B-707s and DC-8s according
to the FAA's standardized measurements, generate approximately 155 effective
perceived noise levels in decibels (EPNdB) over three miles from the start of a
takeoff roll. The equivalent measurement for stage three commercial aircraft is
approximately 87 EPNdB. Since decibels are logarithm units, an increase in 20
EPNdB is perceived as a doubling in loudness. Thus, the reduction in measured
levels of almost 30 EPNdB represents an eightfold decrease in aircraft generated
noise. Id.
40 See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
41 Id.
42 Petitioner, supra note 1, at 16.
4- See Airmark, 758 F.2d at 688.
44 See Brief Amicus Curie of United States Senator Nancy L. Kasselbaum at 1,
Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 758 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Carriers in the United
States have spent billions of dollars buying new compliant airplanes. Id.
45 Id. See Petitioner, supra note 1, at 10. Major carriers bought new compliant
airplanes because of fuel efficiency and other economic reasons. Noise compli-
ance did not serve as a major purchase motivation. Id.
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carriers found option two, re-engining stage one air-
planes, economically unreasonable as the cost far out-
weighed the economic worth.46 Smaller carriers without
large capital funds found the third option, purchasing
hush kits, the most practical since hush kits quiet the en-
gines to acceptable noise levels, yet they do not require
the large capital outlays necessary for options one or
two. 4
7
2. Other Legislation Affecting FAR § 91.303
a. Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act
In 1979, Congress enacted the Aviation Safety and
Noise Abatement Act (ASNA) .48 ASNA provided that
Congress apply the January 1, 1985, compliance date to
aircraft in foreign air commerce if the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) did not adopt noise stan-
dards meeting or exceeding FAR part 36 with a compara-
ble compliance date.49 In 1980, the FAA determined that
IACO had not developed any of the standards called for
by ASNA. Therefore, the FAA applied FAR section
91.303 to foreign carriers, prohibiting foreign aircraft that
do not meet stage two or stage three noise standards from
operating at United States airports.50 Thus, under the
amended version of FAR section 91.303, all foreign and
domestic carriers with four-engine airplanes flying into or
46 See Brief for Petitioner Tradewinds Airway, Ltd. at 44, Airmark Corp. v. FAA,
758 F.2d 685 (D.C.Cir. 1985). More prosperous carriers may be able to spend
$16-18 million to reengine their DC-8 aircraft, but smaller carriers cannot eco-
nomically afford this option. Id. Furthermore, B-707s cannot be reengined. Id.
47 See Id. Hush kits cost about $2.75 million per airplane. 281 Avi. DAILY 6 at
47 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1985).
48 Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. § 2122 (1982).
49 Id. In ASNA, Congress also granted exemptions extending through 1988 for
two and three engine jet aircraft. 49 U.S.C. § 2124. This was labeled the "small
communities" exemption. Id. However, the exempted DC-9 and 737 aircraft op-
erate at many of the large airports in the United States. See Brief of Intervenor
Transamerica Airlines, Inc. at 22, Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 758 F.2d 285 (1985).
[hereinafter cited as Transamerica]. The FAA also exempted 16 supersonic Con-
corde aircraft from noise restrictions. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.311 (1985). The Con-
corde is one of the noisiest commercial jets. See Transamerica at 22.
-o See Transamerica, supra note 49, at 8.
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from the United States had to meet stage two or three
noise standards by January 1, 1985."'
However, the availability of hush kits by the deadline
date concerned Congress. Because of these concerns, the
House Conference Committee encouraged the FAA to
grant exemptions from the noise compliance deadline if
technology was unavailable.52 The committee identified
five considerations to be taken into account in determin-
ing whether a carrier deserved an exemption.53 These five
criteria are: 1) small carrier size; 2) demonstrated good
faith compliance; 3) unavailability of technology; 4) resul-
tant financial havoc; and 5) loss of valuable air service.
While these criteria are not present in any statutory or
regulatory language, nevertheless, the FAA recognized
these criteria as the test for granting an exemption.54 As
the deadline date approached, the FAA further recog-
nized that nearly all the carriers requesting exemptions
met the small size and unavailability of technology crite-
ria.5 5 Therefore, the FAA focused on the good faith com-
pliance, financial havoc, and loss of valuable air service
criteria. 6
If a carrier produced a hush kit contract, then it auto-
5, Id. See also 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1986); Foreign and domestic carriers were re-
quired to do one of three options by January 1, 1985: 1) buy new compliant air-
planes; 2) reengine their exisiting aircraft; or 3) install hush kits in existing
aircraft.
52 H.R. REP. No. 96-715, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 124. The conference committee recommended that the FAA
should consider five considerations in determining exemption applications:
[T]he FAA is urged to give consideration to hardship situations in-
volving smaller carriers where the carrier is making a good faith
compliance effort but needed technology is either delayed or un-
available and rigid adherence to compliance deadlines could work
financial havoc and deprive the public of valuable airline service.
53 Id. See also Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement: Hearings on H.R. 2458, H.R. 3547
and H.R. 3596 before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 113-14 (1979). Two bills were intro-
duced with provisions providing waiver of the compliance date for carriers unable
to comply in a timely manner for "good cause." Id.
- Respondent, supra note 11, at 5.
55 Id.
5c Id. at 5-6.
[52
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matically met the good faith compliance criterion5 7 and
received an exemption if it also demonstrated both finan-
cial havoc and loss of a valuable air service. A carrier met
the financial havoc criterion if the denial of an exemption
forced the carrier to shut down. 8 The loss of valuable air
service criterion applied only if a denial of an exemption
resulted in a total cutoff of air service to a particular
area.59 Few carriers passed this stringent exemption
test.60
On November 15, 1984, after over 100 denials of ex-
emption requests, the FAA granted its first exemption
from FAR section 91.303.61 That exemption allowed Ice-
landair to continue operations to New York, Chicago, Bal-
timore, and Orlando using noncompliant aircraft until the
delivery of their hush kits.62 The exact date of delivery was
indeterminable because hush kits had not been manufac-
tured or certified by the FAA at that time.6 3 The FAA
granted fifteen more exemptions under their general
rulemaking authority,64 and in late December, 1984, the
FAA informally advised all carriers that the deadline date
extended to January 5, 1985.65
b. Hawkins-Chiles Amendment
As the deadline approached, civic leaders from Miami,
Florida, and Bangor, Maine, pressured Congress for relief
from FAR section 91.303. They argued that section
91.303 caused financial havoc to the Miami and Bangor.
51 Id. By producing a hush kit contract the carrier satisfied the good faith com-
pliance criterion. Id.
58 Id. at 6.
59 Id.
- See Airmark, 758 F.2d at 688. The FAA granted 15 exemptions from 145 re-
quests. Id.
61 Brief for Petitioner Tradewinds at 26, Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 758 F.2d 685
(D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Tradewinds].
62 Id. at 26-27.
63 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
- Airmark, 758 F.2d at 688.
- Tradewinds, supra note 61, at 27. The original deadline date was extended
by four days to January 5, 1985. Id. No apparent reason was given for the change.
Id.
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airports, and deprived airline passengers of valuable air
service. In October, 1984, Congress responded to these
arguments by passing the "Hawkins-Chiles Amend-
ment."'6 6 This legislation required the FAA to grant ex-
emptions from FAR section 91.303 for carriers flying to
and from Miami, Florida, and Bangor, Maine, that either
had entered into or issued a sworn committment to enter
into a hush kit contract.67 Furthermore, Congress limited
the exemption to the number of flights that each carrier
flew to and from those airports during the preceding
twelve months. 68 Twenty-five carriers received an exemp-
tion under this amendment.69
In summation, Congress added section 611 to the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 authorizing the FAA to pre-
scribe noise control and abatement standards. 70  The
FAA, in 1969, prescribed FAR part 36 which sets the
noise standards for domestic four-engine aircraft.7 '
There are three noise stages with stage one being the
noisiest and stage three the quietest.7 2 As of January 5,
1985, all domestic four-engine aircraft must meet stage
two or three noise levels of FAR part 3673 per FAR section
91.303. The ASNA75 makes the noise requirements of
FAR part 36 also apply to foreign aircraft.76 In addition,
the Hawkins-Chiles amendment requires the FAA to grant
exemptions from FAR section 91.303 for flights to and
from Miami, Florida, and Bangor, Maine, provided the
carrier enters into or commits to a hush kit contract.77
The exemption is further limited to the number of flights
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 124, 98 Stat. 1970-1971 (1984).
67 Respondent, supra note 11, at 4-5.
68 Id.
6- Airmark, 758 F.2d at 688 n.5.
70 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 39.
73 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
74 See supra note 7.
7- See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
76 Id.
71 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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the carrier flew to those airports during the preceding
twelve months.78
B. Judicial Review of FAA Decisions
The scope of judicial review of FAA actions follows the
broad outlines established for review of all administrative
agency action. The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),'9 which governs judicial review of federal agency
action, codifies the rules the courts developed for admin-
istrative review.80 The Act states:"[T]he reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency ac-
tion."8 Futhermore, the statute states that a court may
hold unlawful any administrative agency's action that the
court considers "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with [the] law," or
that is "unsupported by substantial evidence" based on
the record of the agency hearing.8 2
78 Id.
79 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). To the extent neces-
sary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action the reviewing court
shall:
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) un-
supported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this tide or otherwise reviewed on the record on an
agency hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts
to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the review-
ing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
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When reviewing FAA decisions, courts accord consider-
able deference to determinations within the FAA's area of
expertise so long as the FAA's determination is clearly
based on relevant factors.83 Moreover, the FAA can only
grant exemptions when they serve public interest.84 Even
though FAA decisions based on relevant factors and pub-
lic interest are accorded deference, they still may be over-
turned by a court as arbitrary and capricious for four
reasons.
The first reason is when the FAA's action is inconsistent
with congressional intent.8 5 Since the courts are the final
authorities on statutory construction, they have the re-
sponsibility to reject FAA constructions of a statute that
are inconsistent with congressional intent.8 6 Otherwise,
the FAA could frustrate a congressional statutory
mandate.
Another reason FAA decisions are found arbitrary and
capricious is when FAA actions are discriminatorily ad-
ministered. FAA decisions must be applied consistently
to all carriers in a similar manner in carrying out the statu-
83 See Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983) (standard of review for administrative agencies decisions is the
arbitrary and capricious standard). See also Airline Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 454 F.2d
1052 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The FAA is entitled to considerable deference in respect
to its great expertise in aviation safety. But see Tradewinds, supra note 61, at 30
n.13. The FAA Office of Environment and Energy has acted on petitions for ex-
emptions from § 91.303. Thus, from the FAA's actions they have treated exemp-
tions from FAR § 91.303 as economic regulation in which arguably the FAA does
not have any expertise. Id.
8 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (1982). "The Secretary of
Transporation from time to time may grant exemptions from the requirements of
any rule or regulation prescribed under this subchapter if he finds that such action
would be in the public interest." Id.
85 See Airmark, 758 F.2d at 691.
86 See Federal Election Comm. v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454
U.S. 27, 32 (1982). "The courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory
construction. They must reject administrative constructions of the statute that are
inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress
sought to implement." Id.
87 See United States v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 748 F.2d 56, 62 (2nd Cir.
1984). The "law does not permit an agency to grant to one person the right to do
that which it denies to another similarly situated." Id.
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tory purpose.8 8 Therefore, if the FAA treats similar car-
rier requests differently, the court will overturn the FAA's
decision. 9
A third reason why a court overturns FAA decisions as
arbitrary and capricious is when the FAA changes its in-
terpretation or deviates from earlier decisions without a
reasoned explanation. 90 The FAA cannot grant special
rights to some carriers and deny the same rights to others.
To prevent this, the FAA must give a reasoned explana-
tion for decisional changes, and give the affected parties
an opportunity to demonstrate that they meet the
changes. 9'
The fourth reason FAA decisions are overturned as ar-
bitrary and capricious is when the FAA does not give care-
ful and deliberate consideration in formulating its
decisions in every case. The FAA must take a hard look at
the salient problems and devise criteria to solve these
problems.9 2 Then the FAA must give reasoned considera-
tion to all of the criteria in each case 93 and support this
decision with substantial evidence. 94
Airmark contends that the FAA showed arbitrariness by
denying Airmark an exemption and granting exemptions
to other carriers. 95 Furthermore, the FAA has been arbi-
trary by granting Airmark a partial exemption with restric-
88 See id. See also, Respondent, supra note 11, at 11. The FAA recognizes that it
must apply the same standards to all carriers petitioning for exemptions. Id.
o See supra note 87.
so See Hatch v. FERC, 654 F.2d 825, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1981). "[It is equally settled
that an agency must provide a reasoned explanation for any failure to adhere to its
own precedents." Id.
91 Id.
92 See Greater Boston Television Corp. V. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). "The court must intervene if it becomes
aware that the agency has not taken a hard look at the salient problems .... and
made a reasoned decision." Id.
93 See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968). The court
must particularly assure that the agency "has given reasoned consideration to
each of the pertinent factors. .
9 Id.
95 See Petitioner, supra note 1, at 34-35. Airmark contends the FAA has aban-
doned the § 611(b) criteria and imposed restrictions that do not have a basis in
law. This abandonment is arbitrary and capricious. Id.
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tions of curfew and frequency which are not imposed on
other carriers.96 Thus, the FAA has not acted even-
handedly.9 7
Alternatively, Airmark stresses that the language in sec-
tion 611 of the Federal Aviation Act compels the FAA to
adopt a lenient exemption policy.98 Because hush kits are
not available, Congressional intent mandates that the
FAA grant exemptions until hush kits can be installed.99
Furthermore, the FAA must adopt a formal rulemaking to
consider the noise compliance requirements.100
The interveners agree that the FAA has acted arbitrar-
ily, but for different reasons than Airmark. t0 ' They be-
lieve that according to the criteria, Airmark and other
carriers should not receive an exemption. Therefore, the
FAA arbitrarily granted Airmark a partial exemption.
Furthermore, the interveners challenge the FAA's ability
to grant any exemptions from FAR 91.303.102
The FAA's response is that it applied the criteria con-
sistently to every carrier. It admits that the situation
changed regarding the good faith compliance and finan-
cial havoc tests, 0 3 but denies granting Airmark a partial
exemption was arbitrary or capricious. In addition, con-
trary to the intervenors, the FAA contends that it has the
power to grant exemptions from noise regulations.10 4
Furthermore, since it has not acted on Airmark's request
for a general rulemaking, this issue is not ripe for
6 See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 27-28. Buffalo Airways' partial exemption did
not have a curfew. In addition, Airmark never had the opportunity to argue that a
curfew should not be imposed. Id.
97 Id.
98 See Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 758 F.2d 685, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
- Id. at 690.
100 Id. at 690 n.13.
lo, Id. at 692. See supra note 95 for a discussion of Airmark's arbitrary and capri-
cious argument. See Transamerica, supra note 49, at 33-42. The intervenors claim
the FAA's arbitrariness is shown by the grant of exemptions and partial exemp-
tions starting three days before the deadline. Id.
102 Airmark, 758 F.2d at 691.
los Id. at 689.
104 Id.
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appeal. 10 5
II. AIRMARK v. FAA
Justice Tamm divides his opinion into two parts: Part A
discusses the petitioners' and intervenors' challenge to
the FAA's authority to grant exemptions from the noise
regulations. 0 6 The petitioners contend that the Federal
Aviation Act compels the FAA to adopt a lenient exemp-
tion policy, while the intervenors claim that legislation
adopted after the noise regulations limits the FAA's au-
thority to grant exemptions. 0 7 Part B addresses the argu-
ment of arbitrariness and capriciousness of the FAA by
applying different criteria in similar situations. l'0
First the court disposes of the petitioners argument that
because hush kits are unavailable the language in Section
611 of the Federal Aviation Act mandates relaxation of
the FAA's exemption criteria. 0 9 Petitioners relied on the
language in section 611 which states that in prescribing
and amending noise regulations, the FAA shall "consider
whether any proposed standard or regulation is economi-
cally reasonable, technologically practicable, and appro-
priate for the particular type of aircraft... to which it will
apply.""l0
Although the petitioners are correct in the relevancy of
the language, they are misguided as to when the FAA is to
apply the requirements of economic reasonableness and
technological practicability to the regulations.' The
FAA is to apply these criteria at the inception of the regu-
lation in question.' 1 2 Even if the petitioners contention is
105 Id. at 690 n.13.
'oo Id. at 689.
107 See infra notes 109-133 and accompanying text.
los See Airmark, 758 F.2d at 689.
1o Id.
110 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(d)(4) (1982). See also
Tradewinds, supra note 61, at 16 n.6. The Senate Committee Report made it clear
that the FAA should apply the safeguards of § 611 (b) (4).
II Airmark, 758 F.2d at 690.
112 Id.
207
208 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
true that presently today the regulations are technologi-
cally impracticable because hush kits are unavailable is
true, it does not mean that in considering the regulation's
deadline date eight years ago, the FAA did not consider
the criteria. 1 3 The FAA, by selecting a deadline date
eight years in advance, sought to force the industry to de-
velop commercially available hush kits. 1 4 They reason-
ably concluded that a firm deadline date would spur the
development and implementation of hush kits,'" 5 and the
FAA's conclusion came true in that the approaching dead-
line date caused a stir of industry activity and future avail-
ability of hush kits."16 Therefore, because these criteria
are to be applied at the adoption of the regulations, and
since there is no serious contention that the regulations
were technologically impracticable or economically unrea-
sonable at the time of their adoption eight years ago, sec-
tion 611 is not controlling.'' 7
The intervenors took the approach that two pieces of
legislation adopted after the initial noise regulations, the
Hawkins-Chiles Amendment 1 8 and Aviation Safety and
Noise Abatement Act (ASNA)," t9 showed Congressional
-s Id. The court said, "We find nothing in section 611 that compels the FAA to
adjust the deadline due to the current unavailability of hush kits. The FAA has
already determined the economic resonableness and technological practicabilty of
its noise regulations." Id.
11 Id. at 12. "This policy accords with Congressional intent. In orginally enact-
ing section 611, Congress intended that the FAA impose 'standards which require
the full application of noise reduction technology.'" S. REP. No. 1353, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2688, 2690.
Airmark, 758 F.2d at 690.
1,6 See Respondent, supra note 11, at 14. The court also noted that to require
the FAA to reevaluate its regulations or deadline would erode the FAA's rulemak-
ing authority and send a signal to the regulatory world that deadlines are easily
susceptible to extensions or exemptions. This would cause confusion in the fu-
ture as industry might lag thinking deadlines can be changed. See Airmark, 759
F.2d at 690. The absence of an approaching deadline caused Boeing not to re-
ceive a single order for a B-707 hush kit during the 1970's. Boeing quit the busi-
ness of making hush kits in 1978. Respondent, supra note 11, at 14.
117 Airmark, 758 F.2d at 690. However, the court did go on to explain that even
if this contention had been brought up, the FAA had followed these guidelines in
their promulgation of the regulations. Id.
118 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 124, 98 Stat. 1837, 1930 (1984).
119 Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (1984).
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intent that the FAA should not exempt four-engine air-
craft absent extraordinary and unanticipated circum-
stances not presented in the cases under review.1
20
Although the Senate version of ASNA contained a provi-
sion that allowed the FAA to grant exemptions for "good
cause," 121 the Conference Committee excluded this lan-
guage. 122 Consequently, the intervenors contend that ex-
clusion of the "good cause" language showed
Congressional intent to not allow any exemptions. 23
The court rejected the intervenors argument on two
grounds. First the court noted that repeal by implication
is disfavored. 24 The court believed if Congress intended
to repeal the FAA's exemption authority they would have
clearly expressed the desire. 25 Secondly, according to
legislative history, the conferees espoused that the "good
cause" language is unnecessary because the FAA already
has authority to grant exemptions.1 2 6 Therefore, the court
stated that the committee's exclusion of the good cause
language does not show intent to do away with the FAA's
power to grant exemptions, but is a recognition of that
power. 127
Another claim by the intervenors is that the Hawkins-
Chiles Amendment proves the lack of FAA exemption au-
thority.1 28 Again the court looked at legislative history
and a statement by Senator Baker: " [I]t is my understand-
ing that the provision temporarily exempting Miami Inter-
national Airport ... is in no way intended to inhibit the
Secretary of Transportation from granting exemptions in
120 Airmark, 758 F.2d at 690-91.
121 S. 413, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. § 303, (1979).
122 Id.
123 Airmark, 758 F.2d at 691.
124 Id. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981). (repeal by implication is
disfavored).
125 Airmark 758 F.2d at 691.
126 See Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement: Hearings on H.R. 2458, H.R. 3547 and
H.R. 3596 before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 112-13 (1979). (Testimony of Administrator
Bond indicated "good cause" language was unnecessary).
127 Airmark, 758 F.2d at 691.
128 Id. Pub. L. 98-473, § 124, 98 Stat. 1837, 1970 (1984).
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similar situations."'' 29 The court also considered the
statement of Senator Hawkins who said: "[N]othing in the
exemption we have provided in any way effects [sic] the
broad authority the Secretary possesses to grant exemp-
tions from this or any other regulation at other places or
under other circumstances from those specified in the
amendment."1 30 The court concluded that section 611
did not compel the FAA to grant exemptions and that
neither the ASNA nor the Hawkins-Chiles Amendment
expressly or impliedly limited the FAA's exemption
authority. 13'
After the court established in the first part of the opin-
ion that the FAA had broad authority to grant or deny
exemptions, it went on to decide that the FAA exercised
this power arbitrarily and capriciously. 32 The court
stated that the standard of review for the case is narrow
and the court is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the FAA. 33 However, the FAA cannot treat like cases dif-
ferently. 3 4 The FAA's brief recognized these standards
and responded that "the agency [has] no choice but to
apply the same criteria to all airlines petitioning for ex-
emptions. 1 5 Any other policy would fly in the face of
Congress' intent that air carriers be treated evenhand-
edly." ' 3 6 However, balanced against these standards is the
rule of law that an agency is free to alter its past rulings
and practices even in an adjudicatory setting.1 3 7 Such an
alteration can be made so long as the agency gives a rea-
soned explanation for any failure to adhere to its own pre-
cedent. 13 The petitioners and intervenors claimed that
the FAA applied different criteria to similarly situated car-




13s Id. at 691.
134 Id.
1"3 Id.
136 Id. See Respondent, supra note 11, at 11.
'" Airmark, 758 F.2d at 691-92.
158 Id. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
1986] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
riers in an arbitrary and capricious fashion.13 9
The court stated that if the FAA requires one carrier to
meet all five factors before it grants an exemption, then it
must require the same five factors of other carriers. 40 Af-
ter looking over several petitions for exemptions, the
court ruled that the FAA arbitrarily granted and denied
exemptions. 14 1 The court then gave examples of the
FAA's arbitrary application of the five criteria.
The first of the criteria which the FAA asserted as es-
sential, "valuable air service", is not mentioned in the
grant of exemptions to Ports of Call Travel Club, Buffalo
Airways or Airmark Corporation;142 however, the "valua-'
ble air service" criterion applied in denying exemptions to
other carriers. 43 Since the FAA did not apply this crite-
rion equally to all carriers, the court concluded the FAA
acted arbitrarily. 44
Another criterion that the FAA applied inconsistently is
"good faith compliance." 14 - The FAA changed its early
approach that mere negotiation of a hush kit contract did
not satisfy the "good faith compliance" requirement. 146
In Tradewinds' exemption petition, the FAA said that a
hush kit contract represented some evidence of "good
faith compliance."' 147 Later the FAA went full circle say-
ing that negotiating a hush kit contract conclusively estab-
1s- Id. While both the petitioners and intervenors claimed the FAA has been
arbitrary, they based their contention on different reasons. See Tradewinds, supra
note 61, at 51-61. Tradewinds claims the FAA applied the criteria arbitrarily by
granting exemptions to other carriers and not to them. Id. See also Transamerica,
supra note 49, at 52. Transamerica claims the FAA has been arbitrary because two
days before the deadline they issued exemptions contrary to congressional intent.
Id.
I140 Airmark, 758 F.2d at 692.
141 Id.
142 Id. See also Rich International Airways, Inc., FAA Docket No. 24,231 (Jan. 4
1985). The FAA did not mention valuable air service in granting Rich Airways a
partial exemption.
14- Airmark, 758 F.2d at 692.
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lished a good faith compliance effort.1 48 In a matter of
two months, the FAA went from saying that a hush kit
contract did not satisfy the good faith compliance crite-
rion, to saying that it definitely does satisfy the crite-
rion. 149 Although the court conceded that circumstances
may have changed during this two month period, 150 the
FAA did not give a rational explanation for the complete
change of the good faith compliance criterion.' Further-
more, at the end of the two month period, the FAA once
again refused to recognize a hush kit contract as evidence
of good faith compliance. 152
Next, the court considered the "financial havoc" crite-
rion. 5 3 Under the FAA's initial interpretation of this cri-
terion any carrier that purchased noncompliant airplanes
is precluded from claiming financial havoc. 154 Thus, the
only carriers that met the financial havoc requirement had
stage one airplanes at the inception of the regulations in
1976.1'5 The FAA's interpretation disallowed most ex-
emptions because many of the carriers seeking exemp-
tions are products of deregulation and did not own any
airplanes in 1976.156 However, the FAA granted a partial
exemption to Buffalo Airways on December 28, 1984,
even though the carrier did not own a stage one airplane
until 1984.157 Again the FAA arbitrarily changed the rules
of the game in respect to the financial havoc criterion, and
thereby discriminated against other carriers. 158
With these facts in mind, the court found that the FAA










157 Id. at 694.
158 Id,
lis Id. at 695.
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FAA did not measure Airmark's "valuable air service"
although this is a required criterion.1 60 Second, Airmark
benefitted from the later lenient financial havoc test be-
cause Airmark purchased a noncompliant airplane, yet
passed this test.' 6' Other carriers did not pass the finan-
cial havoc test because they purchased stage one air-
planes. 62 Third, a more lenient good faith compliance
test applied to Airmark since the FAA changed its earlier
position that entering a hush kit contract did not demon-
strate good faith. 63 Because of this disparity by the FAA
in applying and changing criteria, the court vacated
Airmark's partial exemption and granted them time to
reapply for a full exemption.164
In conclusion, the court found that the FAA arbitrarily
and capriciously exercised its exemption power, and the
FAA instead of the court should determine what criteria
the FAA should use.' 65 The court vacated the denials of
exemptions and partial grant to Airmark. 66 The court
also stated that while the FAA retains broad discretion in
determining whether granting or denying exemptions
best serves the public interest, any criteria the FAA
chooses must apply to all exemption requests in a consis-
tent manner. 167 Furthermore, any deviation from past
rulings requires a reasoned explanation. 68
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The court left open what criteria the FAA may choose
'Go Id.
161 Id.
612 Id. at 693.
163 Id.
16, Id. at 695.
16- Id. "We will not prescribe particular criteria for the FAA to apply; the FAA
retains broad discretion to determine whether the public interest will be best
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as long as the FAA consistently applies them.1 69 Since the
judgment, the FAA determined that two classes of peti-
tioners warrant an exemption from FAR section
91.303.170 First, those petitioners that satisfy all five re-
quirements set out by Congress in the Conference Report
on the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act (ASNA)
receive an exemption.' 7' Consequently, any carrier that
demonstrates 1) small size; 2) a good faith compliance ef-
fort; 3) that needed technology is delayed or unavailable;
4) that a denial would result in financial havoc; and 5) per-
formance of valuable air service deserves an exemption.
However, all five criteria must apply in each case.' 72
The second group of carriers that receive noise regula-
tion exemptions are those carriers designated in the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) orders as serving
essential air service. 173 These carriers get an exemption
regardless of whether they satisfy any of the five crite-
ria. 174 The list generally reflects carriers similarly situated
-8 Id. See supra note 165 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's
holding.
170 See Petition of Lineas Aeras Del Caribe, S.A. Grant of Exemption No. 4302,
50 Fed. Reg. 19,102 (1985). This grant of exemption sets out in detail the five
FAA critieria and their definitions. Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
1- Id. Notwithstanding the five criteria test, the FAA has determined that carri-
ers which have been designated in DOT orders to perform service on routes
which have been designated as essential air service routes pursuant to § 419 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (1982)) warrant
special consideration because maintenance of air service on such routes is, by stat-
ute, deemed to be in the public interest. Id. at 19,103. The grant of exemption
for Lineas Aeras del Caribe, S.A., sets out in detail the FAA standards for an ex-
emption based on essential air service. Id.
"74 Id. Notwithstanding the five criteria for a noise exemption from § 91.303,
the FAA will give a carrier an exemption from § 91.303 for a designated essential
air service route if the petitioner shows that it:
(1) is operating noncomplying aircraft on a route for which it has
been found by a DOT order to be providing essential air service and
(2) has a firm contract with a hush kit manufacturer which, before
January 1, 1985 applied for an STC; is continuing active efforts to
obtain the STC; and such contract is supported by a non-refundable
deposit of at least $75,000, for the installation of hush kits on each
of its aircraft at the earliest available date, and (3) acquired the air-
craft for which it seeks an exemption prior to January 1, 1985. See
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as those carriers receiving exemptions because of the
Hawkins-Chiles Amendment.17
While the five criteria are a good starting point, addi-
tional criteria should be added to avoid granting a com-
petitive advantage to noncompliant carriers. Therefore,
two additional criteria should be considered to equalize
the competitive market until all carriers comply with the
noise regulations. These criteria are based on the prem-
ise that FAR deadlines should not provide a competitive
advantage for noncompliant carriers over compliant
carriers.
The suggested sixth criterion is called "fair acquisition
cost." As the noise regulation deadline approached,
noncompliant airplane prices rapidly decreased. 76 While
the deadline date was not the sole cause of this decline in
price, 1 77 it was a major force in driving prices down-
ward.1 7 8 The reason for depressed prices is clear. If the
airplanes did not become compliant by the deadline date,
they would be grounded. 79 Until hush kits became avail-
able and installed, the noncompliant airplanes would be
negative cash producers as the cost of maintenance, stor-
age, and insurance would have to be paid on a non-in-
come producing airplane. Therefore, these noncompliant
airplanes were put on the market at depressed prices on
the reasonable assumption that the FAR deadline would
supra note 9 for a discussion of Supplemental Type Certification
(STC).
175 See supra notes 66-78 for a discussion of the Hawkins-Chiles Amendment
which is analogous to the above exemption test for essential air service.
176 See Avmark Newsletter, Jan. 1984 at 3. Avmark, Inc., commented that immi-
nent FAR § 36 enforcement badly depressed the value of DC-8 airplanes. Fur-
thermore, they said that hush kits would increase the plane's value. See also
Avmark Newsletter, Jan. 1985 at 3. Avmark expects that the value of noncomp-
liant airplanes will increase to a level "well above the current cost of airframe and
hush kits .. " Id.
177 See Petitioner, supra note 1, at 9. Fuel prices were rising and other planes
were more fuel efficient and thus it is argued that fuel costs are a reason for the
depressed prices. Id. But see Transamerica, supra note 49, at 9. Because buyers
and sellers knew that noncompliant airplanes would be grounded January 1, 1985,
the noncompliant planes sold at considerably depressed prices. Id.
178 Id.
179 See Transamerica, supra note 49, at 9.
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be enforced. 8 0 However, without the enforcement of the
deadline, the noncompliant plane can fly and produce
money for the owner. This is the reason for the sixth cri-
terion. Noncompliant airplanes purchased at lower prices
than normal are cheaper to fly than compliant airplanes.
Thus, the compliant carrier is at an economic disadvan-
tage because he relied on and complied with the FAA's
regulations.
Applying the sixth criterion serves two purposes. First,
the sixth criterion equalizes the costs for compliant and
noncompliant carriers by raising the cost of operating
noncompliant aircraft. The cost equalization is achieved
by charging a variable fine based on the number of air
miles flown by noncompliant aircraft. By applying this
fine, the true cost of a noncompliant plane is levied
against the owner, thereby equalizing or balancing the
market situation between compliant and noncompliant
carriers. Secondly, all monies collected from the fines
could be placed into a noise abatement fund for research
regarding noise reduction. Consequently, carriers would
be flying on a true market cost basis and funds would be
generated for noise reduction research.
The seventh criterion suggested is "time." The "time"
criterion is enforced via a fixed fine. Each noncompliant
carrier would be fined a set rate per noncompliant air-
plane for each day the noncompliant airplane flew prior to
January 1, 1985. Such a system would penalize the older
noncompliant carriers more, without severely crippling
carriers that started after deregulation. A fixed fine based
on "time" would make the present system fair because
noncompliant carriers would have to pay for lagging in
their compliance. The compliant carriers have already
paid by bringing their fleet of airplanes within the noise
regulations. Furthermore, even though they should have
been aware of and complied with the deadline, carriers
1 8 See id.
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formed after deregulation would not be shut down, yet
they would pay for their inexperience or mismangement.
While adopting these two extra critieria may equalize
the market forces and competition between compliant and
noncompliant carriers, they are not to be taken as immu-
table. The main purpose is to prevent noncompliant car-
riers from gaining an unfair advantage through
administrative exemptions from deadlines. Therefore, if
the scenario changes, as Buffalo Airways claims, then the
last two critieria should be modified or dropped.'
Buffalo Airways claimed in a September 1985 letter that
its hush kits resulted in a fuel penalty of 15 percent over
the original estimates.18 2 If this is incorrectable and hush
kits turn out to be heavy fuel consumers, then they are a
high cost to the noncompliant carriers and general public.
Therefore, a ratio would need to be developed to change
any rate of fine to take into account the unexpected high
fuel consumption and any other unforeseen costs. Such a
ratio is within the purposes of these criteria to not give
any carrier an advantage over another because of FAA
noise deadlines.
In conclusion, aviation noise is a serious problem. To
alleviate some of the noise, the FAA developed strict
noise standards and gave the carriers a deadline compli-
ance date seven years in advance. Compliance with the
noise regulations cost the compliant carriers millions of
dollars. As a result of the approaching deadline, noncom-
pliant airplanes sold at depressed prices. Noncompliant
carriers who purchased the cheap airplanes should not be
given a competitive advantage over the compliant carriers
who spent millions to honor the deadline. To allow this
financial advantage is unfair and encourages future diso-
bedience of FAA deadlines. As an alternative to ground-
181 See 281 AVIATION DAILY 6 at 47. (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1985). Buffalo Airways
claims that its airplanes retrofitted with hush kits manufacturered by Comtram,
suffered a 15% fuel loss penalty. Comtram, which promised a 2% penalty, denied
Buffalo's claims. Comtram admits, however, that it has never done any inflight or
wind tunnel tests for cruise fuel consumption. Id.
182 Id.
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ing the noncompliant airplanes, two fines are suggested.
Money from the fines could be used to further noise
abatement research and equalize the market airplane cost.
However, the main purpose of the alternative criteria is to
prevent noncompliant carriers from gaining an unfair eco-
nomic advantage over compliant carriers.
Timothy Mark Bates
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